Wirtschaftswissenschaft

Elisabetta Iossa, Giuliana Palumbo

Information Provision and Monitoring of the Decision-Maker in the Presence of an Appeal Process

Jahrgang 163 () / Heft 4, S. 657-682 (6)

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We consider a setting where a decision-maker has to resolve a dispute between two parties. On demand of the losing party, the decision may be subject to review by an appellate body. The decision-maker has discretionary power and may be opportunistic. Depending on the institution design, information on the dispute is provided either by the parties themselves or by an independent investigator. We show that information provision by the parties generates more efficient monitoring through appeals and less opportunism by the decision-maker than information provision by the investigator. We discuss our results in light of the adversarial-versus-inquisitorial controversy.
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Elisabetta Iossa Keine aktuellen Daten verfügbar.

Giuliana Palumbo Keine aktuellen Daten verfügbar.