

Spieltheorie und Schuldrecht



Obligation law - both contract and tort - affects incentives and the strategic interaction between the involved parties. Modern economics relies on the highly-developed game theory to capture strategic interaction. In this volume, Urs Schweizer uses the game-theoretic method to analyze incentives from selected provisions of obligation law. Among others, the game-theoretic method leads to important insights in the following areas: quantifying damages under uncertain causation; distorted incentives for taking care due to inefficient negligence standards and to denying damages for certain losses; the effect of reducing damages for contributory negligence; multi-party joint and several liability; excessive incentives for reliance investments under incomplete contracts, and the incentives to search for information prior to sale.

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