Economics

Anders Poulsen, Odile Poulsen

Endogenous Preferences and Social-Dilemma Institutions

Volume 162 () / Issue 4, pp. 627-660 (34)

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There is robust experimental evidence that some people have selfish preferences, and others have social, or other-regarding, preferences. This paper seeks to explain why there is such preference heterogeneity. In our approach preferences are endogenous to the economy's institutional setup. We consider institutions of the social-dilemma type. Our main result characterizes the endogenous preferences: There is, under a wide set of institutional setups, a unique endogenous preference distribution, where reciprocal, altruistic, and selfish preferences coexist. These results may contribute to understanding how institutions affect preferences.
Authors/Editors

Anders Poulsen No current data available.

Odile Poulsen No current data available.