Economics

David Bruner, Robert J. Oxoby

Investment under Anarchy

Volume 168 () / Issue 4, pp. 731-753 (23)

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This paper presents an experimental test of a 2-player, one-shot game of conflict in which we vary the strength of property rights and the return on investment. Our results suggest that stronger property rights reduce conflict and increase investment. Contrary to intuition, we find increasing the rate of return has practically no effect on investment and that this failure to stimulate investment is largely due to deficiencies in property right institutions.
Authors/Editors

David Bruner Born 1979; 2001 BA Religious Studies, Yale University; 2007 MDiv, Princeton Theological Seminary; 2007−08 studied Luther Seminary; 2008−12 Pastor; 2018 PhD, Princeton Theological Seminary; currently pastor in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA.
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8890-1249

Robert J. Oxoby No current data available.