Economics

Dieter Bös, Martin Kolmar

On the Separation of Award and Contract in Public Procurement

Section: Articles
FinanzArchiv (FA)

Volume 59 () / Issue 4, pp. 425-442 (18)

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In public procurement, a temporal separation of award and actual contracting can frequently be observed. In this paper, we give an explanation for this institutional setting. For imperfect procurement contracts such a separation may increase efficiency. Efficiency can be increased by postaward, pre-contract negotiations between the award-winning firm and one of the losing firms. Surprisingly, the efficiency gains can be higher if the award is given to a seller with a lower reputation for quality instead of to a seller with higher reputation.
Authors/Editors

Dieter Bös No current data available.

Martin Kolmar Geboren 1967; Studium der Volkswirtschaftslehre; 1997 Promotion; 2002 Habilitation; seit 2006 Professor für Angewandte Mikroökonomik an der Universität St. Gallen und Direktor des Instituts für Finanzwissenschaft und Finanzrecht.