Credit Default Swap-Aktivismus

Parties to credit default swaps (CDS) increasingly seek to influence the companies to which their CDS relates in order to secure the profitability of their CDS positions. This activism not only has adverse effects on capital markets but also complicates the restructuring of financially distressed companies. Julian Franke examines this phenomenon by providing a factual account, an economic analysis, and a legal assessment. The study focuses on German civil law and European Union capital market law, while comparative insights into U.S. law provide the foundation for a comprehensive understanding of the regulation of the global CDS market. The author demonstrates that CDS activism generally results in overall welfare losses and is therefore, rightly, largely prohibited under current law. He recommends introducing a transparency regime for CDS positions to improve the steering function of private enforcement. Furthermore, the state should prohibit certain CDS activism strategies and ensure their enforcement. The legal assessment raises a number of fundamental questions: How should standardized, market-wide contracts be interpreted? What duties of cooperation arise in the context of corporate restructuring? How should self-created inside information be treated under insider trading law? When are prices considered artificial? Julian Franke engages with these debates and thereby contributes to fundamental discussions in financial law.

Einleitung
§ 1 Definition des Themas und Forschungsstand
§ 2 Forschungsprogramm
§ 3 Gang der Untersuchung
§ 4 Methodik
Teil 1 Grundlagen
§ 1 CDS
§ 2 Aktivismus
§ 3 CDS-Aktivismus
Teil 2 Net-short-Sabotage
§ 1 Problembeschreibung
§ 2 Ökonomische Analyse
§ 3 Rechtliche Bewertung
Teil 3 Kooperative Strategien
§ 1 Problembeschreibung
§ 2 Ökonomische Analyse
§ 3 Rechtliche Bewertung
Zusammenfassung der wichtigsten Ergebnisse