Anarchy, Monopoly, and Predation - 10.1628/093245607781871327 - Mohr Siebeck

Peter T. Leeson

Anarchy, Monopoly, and Predation

Volume 163 () / Issue 3, pp. 467-482 (16)

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Although institutions rooted in the folk theorem can support self-enforcing exchange in a wide variety of contexts, their potential to create cooperation is not limitless. In particular, the folk theorem may break down when some agents are physically stronger than others. I demonstrate this in the context of Stringham's [2006] vertically integrated proprietary communities. In this system a monopoly proprietor maximizes profits by optimally extorting his tenants in violation of voluntary contracts. The result is a predatory rather than voluntary regime. (JEL: D 74, H 10, K 40, L 33)

Peter T. Leeson No current data available.