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Cover of: Balance Billing as an Adherence-to-Treatment Signalling Device
Damien Besancenot, Radu Vranceanu, Karine Lamiraud

Balance Billing as an Adherence-to-Treatment Signalling Device

Section: Articles
Volume 177 (2021) / Issue 3, pp. 359-390 (32)
Published 19.07.2021
DOI 10.1628/jite-2021-0011
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  • 10.1628/jite-2021-0011
Summary
In some countries, including France, patients can choose between consulting a physician working in the regulated sector (where, in general, fees are fully covered by health insurance) and a physician working in the unregulated sector (where a balance-billing scheme operates). In the latter, patients must make out-of-pocket payments. The paper analyzes the signalling properties of this mechanism. The model reveals that a small extra fee allows obtaining a separating equilibrium in which only patients with a high propensity to adhere to the treatment will opt for the unregulated sector and will benefit from a larger care effort on the part of their physician. We also analyze the other equilibria of the game.