Dan Simon

Can We Trust Humans with Legal Reasoning?

Section: Conference Articles 6
Volume 182 (2026) / Issue 1, pp. 156-180 (25)
Published 05.06.2026
DOI 10.1628/jite-2026-0018
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Summary

Before indulging in the perplexing prospect of legal reasoning by machines, we must recognize that machine learning is built upon, closely tied with, and compared against human performance on this task. Yet the predominant strand
of American judicial reasoning violates norms of principled legal reasoning. From a psychological perspective, these violations can be understood as the natural offshoots of the cognitive processes that make complex decision making possible. These violations have potential implications for legal reasoning by Artificial Intelligence as judicial opinions are an ideal source of training material for AI, especially in Common Law regimes. The question is whether we should prompt machines to imitate human judges or to strip away the imprints of human foibles and biases that judges imprint on their opionions. The latter option opens the door to the prospect of machines showing greater fidelity to the law than the judges in whom we entrust this vital societal function.