Combating Corruption with Bargaining Disruption - 10.1628/093245609789472032 - Mohr Siebeck
Economics

Fabio Méndez

Combating Corruption with Bargaining Disruption

Volume 165 () / Issue 3, pp. 438-453 (16)

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This paper presents a theoretical model in which governments regulate economic activity and individuals bypass the regulations by paying bribes to the public officials who monitor their businesses; the amount of the bribe is the subject of bargaining. The paper then introduces a policy that disrupts the bribe-bargaining process by rewarding public officials beyond what they would expect to receive if they accepted a bribe. This policy is referred to as bargaining disruption. The results of the model suggest that such policies can effectively combat corruption.
Authors/Editors

Fabio Méndez No current data available.