Fragmentation in Property: Towards a General Model - 10.1628/0932456022975196 - Mohr Siebeck

Norbert Schulz, Francesco Parisi, Ben Depoorter

Fragmentation in Property: Towards a General Model

Volume 158 () / Issue 4, pp. 594-613 (20)

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This paper develops a general model of anticommons fragmentation in property. Using several related examples, we consider the equilibria obtained under different scenarios. The various illustrations are later utilized to develop a model of fragmented property. The model reveals that the private incentives of excluders do not capture the external effects of their individual decisions. Our model suggests that the results of underutilization of joint property increase monotonically in both (a) the extent of fragmentation and (b) the forgone synergies and complementarities between the property fragments. We explore some important implications for the institutional responses to issues of property fragmentation.

Norbert Schulz Geboren 1950; Studium der Mathematik und der Wirtschaftswissenschaften in Bonn und Berkeley (Kalifornien), 1980 Ph.D.; 1994 Habilitation; Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insb. Industrieökonomik, an der Universität Würzburg.

Francesco Parisi No current data available.

Ben Depoorter No current data available.