Fremdbestimmung durch Selbstbestimmung Die »Entscheidungsalternative« als Grundrechtsproblem - 10.1628/000389116X14525976022289 - Mohr Siebeck

Josef Franz Lindner

Fremdbestimmung durch Selbstbestimmung Die »Entscheidungsalternative« als Grundrechtsproblem

Volume 140 () / Issue 4, pp. 542-570 (29)

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This essay deals with the dialectic structure of self-determination. At the beginning the article points out self-determination as a possible and an important model of legitimation. It means in effect, that if an action is based on informed consent, the action will be justified by the legal system without the need of a further justification. Although self-determination is seen as an indispensable postulate of our legal system, it needs also to be seen from a critical point of view. Self-determination at the same time holds potential for heteronomy and additionally also dangers for freedom. Self-determination is on one hand precondition and characteristic for freedom, but on the other hand it is not thinkable without heteronomy. Because of this contrast the selfdetermination shows a dialectic-paradoxical structure. In this respect there are different potentials of danger for freedom: First there is loss of freedom in the heteronomy itself. Further there is loss of freedom in the (assumed) release of other justification and there is loss of freedom in the loss of the individual decision alternative. Referring to the different potentials of danger for freedom the attention has to be turned to the consequences for the law. First of all the jurisprudential and political discussion should show a moderate dimension of skepticism compared to the paradigm of self-determination as the only model of legitimation. Special attention should be paid to the progress in biomedical science and information technology as well as to existential decisions. Further it has to be discussed, if there is a »basic right of decision alternative«. It could be established as an own basic right or it could be deducted from an already existing basic right, for example the human dignity or the general right of privacy. Self-determination is an important normative ruling principle. But you cannot disregard its dialectic-paradoxical structure. This should be an occasion to question the force of legitimation of self-determination – especially in biomedical discourse. Particularly public law should contribute the thesis to the discussion that the respective decision alternative is protected under the basic constitutional law and has to be saved from unauthorized violation by the state or a third person.

Josef Franz Lindner ist Professor für Öffentliches Recht, Medizinrecht und Rechtsphilosophie an der Universität Augsburg.