Institutional Imperfections and Buyer-Induced Holdout in Land Acquisition - 10.1628/jite-2021-0012 - Mohr Siebeck
Economics

Sreeparna Saha, Prabal Roy Chowdhury, Jaideep Roy, Grazyna Wiejak-Roy

Institutional Imperfections and Buyer-Induced Holdout in Land Acquisition

Volume 177 () / Issue 3, pp. 261-298 (38)
Published 26.07.2021

38,00 € including VAT
article PDF
We look beyond the well-studied issues of fair compensation, regulatory takings, and seller-induced holdout that arise in the government purchase of land for economic development. We argue that political rivalry distorts land acquisition negotiations between private sellers and a private buyer driven by profits. We determine these distortions endogenously and characterise conditions when the buyer's optimal design to acquire land generates holdout. We analyse how bureaucratic corruption that increases transaction costs affects the degree and direction of political distortions and the incidence of holdout. We find that the size of corruption has nuanced nonmonotonic influences on holdout, seller welfare, and buyer's profits.
Authors/Editors

Sreeparna Saha No current data available.

Prabal Roy Chowdhury No current data available.

Jaideep Roy No current data available.

Grazyna Wiejak-Roy No current data available.