Libel Bullies, Defamation Victims, and Litigation Incentives - 10.1628/jite-2021-0003 - Mohr Siebeck
Economics

David J. Acheson, Ansgar Wohlschlegel

Libel Bullies, Defamation Victims, and Litigation Incentives

Volume 177 () / Issue 2, pp. 135-166 (32)
Published 04.02.2021

32,00 € including VAT
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In the context of defamation law, we analyze a public figure's incentives to bring negative-value defamation suits in order to appear litigious, and how this affects her incentives to do wrong in the first place and the media's incentives to expose this wrongdoing. In equilibrium, the public figure's litigation incentives depend both on her own direct costs and benefits of doing so, and on journalists' costs and benefits from litigation and publication. Furthermore, equilibrium wrongdoing and publication choices depend on an otherwise nonlitigious public figure's litigation payoffs. Potential effects of legal reform are briefly discussed.
Authors/Editors

David J. Acheson No current data available.

Ansgar Wohlschlegel No current data available.