Merger and Collusion in Contests - 10.1628/0932456022975277 - Mohr Siebeck

Steffen Huck, Kai A. Konrad, Wieland Müller

Merger and Collusion in Contests

Volume 158 () / Issue 4, pp. 563-575 (13)

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Competition in some product markets takes the form of a contest. If some firms cooperate in such markets, they must decide how to allocate effort on each of their products and whether to reduce the number of their products in the competition. We show how this decision depends on the convexity properties of the contest success function, and we characterize conditions under which cooperation is profitable.

Steffen Huck No current data available.

Kai A. Konrad No current data available.

Wieland Müller No current data available.