Mix-and-Match Compatibility in Asymmetric System Markets - 10.1628/093245612800933997 - Mohr Siebeck
Economics

Jong-Hee Hahn, Sang-Hyun Kim

Mix-and-Match Compatibility in Asymmetric System Markets

Volume 168 () / Issue 2, pp. 311-338 (28)

28,00 € including VAT
article PDF
This paper shows that the private incentive for mix-and-match compatibility in system markets diverges from the social planner's incentive if competing suppliers are asymmetric in production cost or product quality. There can be too much or too little compatibility when the market is served by fully integrated system suppliers. Also, the market outcome involves socially too much incompatibility in the form of exclusive technological alliances when the market is composed of independent component suppliers. These results contrast with the standard one obtained in the symmetric setup and shed new light on public policy towards compatibility, technological alliances, and bundling practices in system markets.
Authors/Editors

Jong-Hee Hahn No current data available.

Sang-Hyun Kim No current data available.