On Repeated Games with Endogenous Matching Decision - 10.1628/093245615X14302136524716 - Mohr Siebeck
Economics

Heiner Schumacher

On Repeated Games with Endogenous Matching Decision

Volume 171 () / Issue 3, pp. 544-564 (21)

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We study infinitely repeated games that are played by many groups simultaneously and where players have the option to maintain or quit relationships. For two-player stage games any individually rational payoff vector in the relative interior of V* can be sustained as equilibrium payoff if the discount factor δ is sufficiently large. Such a statement is not possible for stage games with more than two players. We translate the refinement of weak renegotiation-proofness to our framework and characterize the set of payoffs that can be sustained through strategies that are »bilaterally rational« in the sense of Ghosh and Ray (1996).
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Heiner Schumacher No current data available.