On the Coevolution of Retribution and Trustworthiness: An (Indirect) Evolutionary and Experimental Analysis - 10.1628/093245607780182008 - Mohr Siebeck
Economics

Werner Güth, Hartmut Kliemt, M. Vittoria Levati, Georg von Wangenheim

On the Coevolution of Retribution and Trustworthiness: An (Indirect) Evolutionary and Experimental Analysis

Volume 163 () / Issue 1, pp. 143-157 (15)

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Standard economic explanations of good conduct in trade rely almost exclusively on future-directed extrinsic motivations induced by material incentives. But intrinsic motives to behave trustworthily and to punish untrustworthiness do support trade. In our model, intrinsically motivated players are aware of their own type and observe the population share of other types. The material success of various types and their coevolution are analyzed, and it is checked whether the dynamics of the indirect evolutionary analysis are replicated in the laboratory.
Authors/Editors

Werner Güth ist emeritierter Direktor am Max-Planck-Institut für Erforschung von Kollektivgütern in Bonn.

Hartmut Kliemt Professor für praktische Philosophie an der Universität Duisburg-Essen.

M. Vittoria Levati No current data available.

Georg von Wangenheim No current data available.