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Cover of: Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts Redux
Jonathan Thomas, Tim Worrall

Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts Redux

Section: Articles
Volume 179 (2023) / Issue 3, pp. 441-469 (29)
Published 30.11.2023
DOI 10.1628/jite-2023-0039
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  • 10.1628/jite-2023-0039
This paper provides our reflections on self-enforcing wage contracts.We present a simple version of the model of Thomas and Worrall (1988) and explain its motivation, contribution, and methodology. We discuss some of its limitations, the development of literature, and its connection to the literature on relational contracting with an observable effort cost. We suggest some open questions for the future development of the literature.