Stakeholder Influence and Optimal Regulations: A Common-Agency Analysis of Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Regulations - 10.1628/093245613X13620416111245 - Mohr Siebeck
Economics

Margrethe Aanesen, Claire Armstrong

Stakeholder Influence and Optimal Regulations: A Common-Agency Analysis of Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Regulations

Volume 169 () / Issue 2, pp. 320-338 (19)

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One aspect of ecosystem-based management is to include new stakeholders. When an environmental NGO (ENGO) gets a say in the fisheries management, this will affect the authorities' optimal regulation. Combining a principal-agent model and a steady-state bioeconomic model, we show that under symmetric information the authorities will moderate their use of regulation as a response to the ENGO's increased influence. However, the aggregate of the authorities' and the ENGO's regulations will be stronger. On introducing asymmetric information, the regulation of the high-cost fishers relative to the low-cost fishers is weaker than under a single principal.
Authors/Editors

Margrethe Aanesen No current data available.

Claire Armstrong No current data available.