State Liability for Wrongful Conviction: Incentive Effects on Crime Levels - 10.1628/093245607781261423 - Mohr Siebeck
Economics

Vincy Fon, Hans-Bernd Schäfer

State Liability for Wrongful Conviction: Incentive Effects on Crime Levels

Volume 163 () / Issue 2, pp. 269-284 (16)

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Wrongful convictions may increase the level of crime over the ideal case of their absence. The problem of wrongful conviction is most serious in areas where crime is endemic and for certain groups of citizens who are stereotyped. State liability mitigates this problem; compensating the wrongfully convicted induces some individuals not to commit crimes, thereby leading to a lower crime level. However, state liability may distort the behavior of judges if the welfare of judges is inversely related to compensation for wrongful conviction. We address policy implications that minimize such distortions.
Authors/Editors

Vincy Fon No current data available.

Hans-Bernd Schäfer Professor für Volkswirtschaftslehre an der Universität Hamburg (1976–2008), seit 2009 Affiliate Professor für Law and Economics an der Bucerius Law School in Hamburg.