The Questionable Efficiency of the Efficient-Breach Doctrine - 10.1628/093245612799440014 - Mohr Siebeck
Economics

Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir

The Questionable Efficiency of the Efficient-Breach Doctrine

Volume 168 () / Issue 1, pp. 5-26 (22)

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The doctrine of efficient breach is based on the belief that the risk of postcontractual bargaining failure under property rules is greater than the risk of the courts' miscalculation of damages under liability rules. The article presents the findings of two experiments that challenge this belief and suggest that courts systematically undercompensate promisees. Implementation of the efficient-breach doctrine might therefore lead to underdeterrence and inefficiency.
Authors/Editors

Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir No current data available.