University Funding Reform, Competition, and Teaching Quality - 10.1628/093245607781261405 - Mohr Siebeck
Economics

Alexander Kemnitz

University Funding Reform, Competition, and Teaching Quality

Volume 163 () / Issue 2, pp. 356-378 (23)

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This paper explores the impact of university funding reform on teaching-quality competition. It shows that a graduate tax with differentiated, but state-regulated fees maximises the higher-education surplus, whereas student grants as well as pure and income-contingent loans do not. Fee autonomy for universities leads to results inferior to properly state-controlled fees and can make the majority of students even worse off than a central student assignment system with very poor teaching incentives.
Authors/Editors

Alexander Kemnitz Born 1968; 1993 Diplom-Volkswirt, University of Bonn; 2000 Dr. rer. pol., University of Mannheim; 2005 Habilitation in Economics.