Yes-Men and No-Men: Does Defiance Signal Talent? - 10.1628/0932456032954710 - Mohr Siebeck
Economics

Jeong-Yoo Kim, Keunkwan Ryu

Yes-Men and No-Men: Does Defiance Signal Talent?

Volume 159 () / Issue 3, pp. 468-490 (23)

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We provide the rationale for the existence of yes-men and no-men in an organization or a group. On one hand, a person is inclined to conform to the instruction of another, because he cannot ignore the information contained in the instruction, even though his own evidence contradicts the instruction. On the other hand, if only the person himself knows the accuracy of his own information, he may tend to disobey the instruction, to make others believe that he is able in the sense that his information is accurate. We demonstrate that disobedience can signal high ability in an equilibrium.
Authors/Editors

Jeong-Yoo Kim No current data available.

Keunkwan Ryu No current data available.