Arbeitsverträge

The annual Ottobeuren Seminar on Economics brings together experts on a previously chosen subject. The special purpose of these seminars is to present new theoretical approaches as well as new empirical findings and to discuss the political-economic conclusions with them. This volume contains the papers and the supplementary papers presented at the 37th Seminar on the subject of »labor contracts.« They deal with the reasons for and the effects of regulations in individual and collective labor contracts. Their purpose is to contribute to a better understanding of the microeconomics of labor markets.Günter Bamberg: Kann eine gewinnabhängige Entlohnung sowohl für die Unternehmung wie für die Arbeitnehmer vorteilhaft sein? – Urs Schweizer: Die schadensrechtliche Lösung von Hold-up-Problemen – Hans Jürgen Ramser: Managerbezüge: Anmerkungen zur Revision des traditionellen Modells – Peter-J. Jost: Eine ökonomische Theorie der Mitarbeiterführung – Alwine Mohnen, Kathrin Pokorny, Dirk Sliwka: Team Production, Peer Pressure, and Information Systems – Uschi Backes-Gellner, Kerstin Pull: Ökonomische Analyse von Incentive-Reisen – Oliver Fabel: Incomplete Contracts and Innovative Spin-offs: Using Financial Governance Structures to Implement Incentives – Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Sabrina Bleich, Werner Güth: Wage Flexibility in Ongoing Employment Relations: An Experiment with a Stochastic Labor Market – Laszlo Goerke: The Effects of Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts in the Presence of Collective Bargaining Contracts – Wolfgang Franz, Nicole Gürtzgen, Stefanie Schubert, Markus Clauss: Reformen im Niedriglohnsektor: Eine integrierte CGE-Mikrosimulationsstudie der Arbeitsangebots- und Beschäftigungseffekte