Economics

Conferences on New Political Economy

Vol. 23: International Conflict Resolution
Ed. by Stefan Voigt, Max Albert and Dieter Schmidtchen

[Internationale Konfliktlösung]

2006. VIII, 374 pages.
139,00 €
including VAT
cloth - Formerly: Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie
ISBN 978-3-16-148715-6
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Published in English.
Increased international interdependence has also greatly increased the potential for international conflicts. The papers of this volume ask what factors help to explain the different success rates of various international courts, and whether more or other international courts are needed.
Increased international interdependence – globalization – has also greatly increased the potential for international conflict in various areas such as trade, competition, the environment, and human rights. Observers have counted up to 40 international courts that serve to settle such conflicts. What are adequate criteria to measure the effectiveness of international courts? What factors explain the differences in their success? What factors explain the differences of nation-state governments in delegating competence to international courts in the first place? Should there be any additional courts? This volume assembles ten papers and comments that contain first steps in answering these questions. Their authors are legal scholars and economists, but also political scientists and philosophers. With this volume the »Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie« has changed its title to »Conferences on New Political Economy".
Survey of contents
Preface of the Editors – Stefan Voigt: Introduction – Daniel Sutter: The Deterrent Effects of the International Criminal Court – Kai Ambos: Comment – Anne van Aaken: Making International Human Rights Protection More Effective: A Rational-Choice Approach to the Effectiveness of Provisions for Ius Standi – Stefan Oeter: Comment – Eric Neumayer: Do international human rights treaties improve respect for human rights? – Lars P. Feld: Comment – Eric A. Posner: The Decline of the International Court of Justice – Gralf-Peter Calliess: Comment – Tom Ginsburg: International Judicial Lawmaking – Dieter Schmidtchen: Comment – Cesare P.R. Romano: International Courts and Tribunals: Price, Financing and Output – Wolfgang Kerber: Comment – Laurence R. Helfer: Why States Create International Tribunals: A Theory of Constrained Independence – Stefan Voigt: Comment – George Tridimas: The relevance of confederate structures in the judicial architecture of the Draft EU Constitution – Hans-Bernd Schäfer: Comment – Justus Haucap, Florian Müller and Christian Wey: How to Reduce Conflicts Over International Antitrust? – Karl M. Meessen: Comment – Wilfried Hinsch and Markus Stepanians: International Justice and the Problem of Duty Allocation – Max Albert: Comment
Authors/Editors

Stefan Voigt is a professor at the University of Hamburg and director of the Institute for Law and Economics at the University of Hamburg, fellow of the CESifo in Munich and connected to the International Centre for Economic Research (ICER) in Turin.

Max Albert Geboren 1959; 1992 Dr. rer. pol. und 1998 Habilitation an der Universität Konstanz; 1998 bis 2003 Professor für Wirtschaftswissenschaft an der Universität Koblenz-Landau in Landau; 2003 bis 2007 Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für Wirtschaftstheorie an der Universität des Saarlandes; seit 2007 Professor für Verhaltens- und Institutionenökonomik an der Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen.

Dieter Schmidtchen holds the chair for Public Policy and Managerial Economics at University of the Saarland and is director of the Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Saarbrücken.

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