Law

Martin Nettesheim / Stefan Thomas

Entflechtung im deutschen Kartellrecht

Wettbewerbspolitik, Verfassungsrecht, Wettbewerbsrecht

[Deconcentration in German Antitrust Law. Competition Policy, Constitutional Law, Competition Law.]

69,00 €
including VAT
cloth
ISBN 978-3-16-150854-7
available
Published in German.
The study scrutinizes and evaluates the proposal of introducing a deconcentration instrument into German antitrust law. The authors of the present book take the position that companies must not become the object of governmental market design. Breaking up dominant firms as an antitrust remedy is problematic, since governmental planning and not competition would decide about company size and market structure. The economic freedom of companies and their shareholders is protected under constitutional law and comprises the freedom to grow.
The study scrutinizes and evaluates the proposal of introducing a deconcentration instrument into German antitrust law. The authors of the present book take the position that companies must not become the object of governmental market design. Breaking up dominant firms as an antitrust remedy is problematic, since governmental planning and not competition would decide about company size and market structure. The economic freedom of companies and their shareholders is protected under constitutional law and comprises the freedom to grow.
Authors/Editors

Martin Nettesheim ist Professor für Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht, Europarecht und Völkerrecht in Tübingen.

Stefan Thomas ist Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für Bürgerliches Recht, Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht, Wettbewerbs- und Versicherungsrecht an der Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen.

Reviews

The following reviews are known:

In: Transpatent Advobook — http://www.transpatent.com/advobook/de561547.html (07/2011)