Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie

doi:10.1628/978-3-16-165190-8

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Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie

Band 22: European Governance

Edited by Dieter Schmidtchen, Manfred E. Streit, Hartmut Kliemt and Manfred J. Holler

2003. 322 pages. Unrevised ebook edition 2025.

Conferences on New Political Economy (früher: Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie) (CNPE)

DOI 10.1628/978-3-16-165190-8

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Summary

Authors/Editors

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Summary

The enlargement of the European Union to 25 member states will require a reform of the institutional structures and decision-making mechanisms for Europe to be governable. In this volume, economists and political scientists show which competences and decision-making procedures could fulfil the criteria for good governance: efficiency, transparency, openness, coherence and democracy.

The articles and comments in this volume address big issues of the debate on European Governance. Adopting a rational choice perspective, the topics range from, for instance, the sectoral organization of the Council of Ministers, a contract-theoretic analysis of the Commission's behavior and the distribution of voting power, to the pros and cons of competitive government and interest group influence on EU legislation.

Table of contents:

Dieter Schmidtchen: Editorial Preface Institutions Bernard Steunenberg: Deciding among Equals: The Sectoral Councils of the European Union and their Reform (Comment by Ronald Heiner) - Roger Congleton: On the Merits of Bicameral Legislatures: Policy Stability within Partisan Polities (Comment by Dennis C. Mueller) - Urs Schweizer: Technical Detail to the Discretion of the Commission? The Contract-Theoretic Analysis of an Agent's Desire (Comment by Gebhard Kirchgässner) - Stefan Voigt: Iudex Calculat: The ECJ's Quest for Power (Comment by Hans-Bernd Schäfer) Voting Power Dennis Leech: Power Indices as an Aid to Institutional Design: The Generalised Apportionment Problem (Comment by Manfred Holler) - Dennis Leech and Moshé Machover: Qualified Majority Voting: The Effect of the Quota (Comment by Max Albert) Competitive Government Giorgio Brosio and Federico Revelli: The Assignment of the Income Redistribution Policy in the Presence of Migration (Comment by Günther G. Schulze) - Berthold Wigger and Udo Wartha: How to Allocate the Power to Tax in Europe? (Comment by Bernhard Neumärker) - Pierre Salmon: Assigning Powers in the European Union in the Light of Yardstick Competition among Governments (Comment by Roland Kirstein) - Reiner Eichenberger: Towards a European Market for Good Politics - A Politico-Economic Reform Proposal (Comment by Roland Kirstein) Interest Groups Gerald Schneider and Konstantin Baltz: Specialization Pays Off: Interest Group Influence on EU Legislation in Four Member States (Comment by Hans-Jörg Schmidt-Trenz) Enlargement Thomas König and Thomas Bräuninger: The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union - An Institutionalist Analysis of Policy Positions, Accession Scenarios and Institutional Reform (Comment by Jean-Michel Josselin and Alain Marciano) Paul Nemitz: Convention, Governance, Reform of Institutions - Towards a Political Europe that Works?

Authors/Editors

Dieter Schmidtchen holds the chair for Public Policy and Managerial Economics at University of the Saarland and is director of the Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Saarbrücken.

Manfred E. Streit

Hartmut Kliemt Professor für praktische Philosophie an der Universität Duisburg-Essen.

Manfred J. Holler Professor für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Geschäftsführender Direktor des Instituts für Allokation und Wettbewerb der Universität Hamburg.