Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)

Christoph Engel, Urs Schweizer

Editorial Preface

pp. 1-3 (3)

Yeon-Koo Che, Kathryn E. Spier

Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer

pp. 4-23 (20)

Jennifer F. Reinganum

Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer

pp. 24-26 (3)

Alexander Stremitzer

Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer

pp. 27-30 (4)

Bruno Deffains, Dominique Demougin

The Inquisitorial and the Adversarial Procedure in a Criminal Court Setting

pp. 31-43 (13)

Gerd Muehlheusser

The Inquisitorial and the Adversarial Procedure in a Criminal Court Setting

pp. 44-46 (3)

William J. Stuntz

Inequality and Adversarial Criminal Procedure

pp. 47-51 (5)

Alon Klement, Zvika Neeman

Civil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design Framework

pp. 52-67 (16)

Bruno Deffains

Civil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design Framework

pp. 68-71 (4)

Hans-Bernd Schäfer

Civil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design Framework

pp. 72-75 (4)

Benjamin E. Hermalin

Vague Terms: Contracting when Precision in Terms is Infeasible

pp. 76-94 (19)

Christoph Engel

Poor Judicial Performance: When should the Parties Care?

pp. 95-98 (4)

The Charms of Vagueness in Contracts

pp. 99-105 (7)

Andrew F. Daughety, Jennifer F. Reinganum

Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure

pp. 106-126 (21)

Yeon-Koo Che

Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure

pp. 127-129 (3)

Alon Klement, Zvika Neeman

Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure

pp. 130-133 (4)

Avery W. Katz

Contractual Enforcement Institutions and the Structure of Information

pp. 134-154 (21)

Alan Schwartz

Contractual Enforcement Mechanisms and the Structure of Information

pp. 155-158 (4)

Urs Schweizer

Contractual Enforcement Institutions and the Structure of Information

pp. 159-162 (4)

Andreas Blume, Paul Heidhues

Modeling Tacit Collusion in Auctions

pp. 163-184 (22)

Ulrich Kamecke

Modeling Tacit Collusion in Auctions

pp. 185-188 (4)

Ulrich Schwalbe

Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions

pp. 189-192 (4)