A Citizen-Candidate Model of Tax Competition with Interdependent Preferences - 10.1628/fa-2020-0011 - Mohr Siebeck
Economics

Satoshi Kasamatsu, Taku Masuda, Hikaru Ogawa

A Citizen-Candidate Model of Tax Competition with Interdependent Preferences

Section: Articles
FinanzArchiv (FA)

Online First, pp. 1-16 (16)
Published 22.09.2020

16,00 € including VAT
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In a citizen-candidate model of tax competition, this study describes the emergence of a policymaker (political leader) that has a hostile or altruistic stance toward neighboring countries. The results show that (i) when countries competing for mobile capital have similar positions on the import/export of capital, an altruistic citizen will be elected as the political leader, and (ii) when their capital positions differ, a citizen that has malicious preferences can become the representative of the country.
Authors/Editors

Satoshi Kasamatsu No current data available.

Taku Masuda No current data available.

Hikaru Ogawa No current data available.