An Alternative Algorithm for Identifying Free Riders Based on a No-Free-Rider Nash Equilibrium - 10.1628/001522107X220116 - Mohr Siebeck
Economics

Ratna K. Shrestha, Kwang Soo Cheong

An Alternative Algorithm for Identifying Free Riders Based on a No-Free-Rider Nash Equilibrium

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FinanzArchiv (FA)

Volume 63 () / Issue 2, pp. 278-284 (7)

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In identifying the free riders in the voluntary provision of a pure public good, Andreoni and McGuire (1993) simplify Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian's (1986) algorithm by systematizing the selection process of potential contributors. We propose an alternative algorithm in which a concept of no-free-rider Nash equilibrium is utilized to identify potentially a large fraction of free riders in Nash equilibrium without conducting any Nash solution tests for them.
Authors/Editors

Ratna K. Shrestha No current data available.

Kwang Soo Cheong No current data available.