Capital Accumulation, Welfare, and the Emergence of Pension-Fund Activism - 10.1628/001522107X186728 - Mohr Siebeck
Economics

Pascal Belan, Philippe Michel, Bertrand Wigniolle

Capital Accumulation, Welfare, and the Emergence of Pension-Fund Activism

Section: Articles
FinanzArchiv (FA)

Volume 63 () / Issue 1, pp. 54-82 (29)

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This paper presents an overlapping-generations model with altruistic consumers, in which pension funds, by holding a significant share of capital assets, produce noncompetitive behavior. We study the consequences of such behavior for capital accumulation and welfare in the long run when subsidies are associated with contributions to pension funds. If bequests are operative and the subsidy rate is not too high, the capital stock increases with the introduction of pension funds, and this increases long-run utility. If bequests are not operative without pension funds, the rise in long-run welfare is no longer guaranteed, even if the subsidy rate is low.
Authors/Editors

Pascal Belan No current data available.

Philippe Michel No current data available.

Bertrand Wigniolle No current data available.