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Cover of: Fiscal Transfer in a Repeated-Interaction Model of Tax Competition
Hikaru Ogawa, Keisuke Kawachi, Wenming Wang

Fiscal Transfer in a Repeated-Interaction Model of Tax Competition

Section: Articles
Volume 70 (2014) / Issue 4, pp. 556-566 (11)
Published 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/001522114X685483
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  • 10.1628/001522114X685483
Summary
This paper analyzes how a fiscal transfer scheme affects tax cooperation in a repeated-interaction model of tax competition. In particular, the paper studies whether a fiscal transfer scheme promotes or blocks voluntary tax cooperation. It is shown that the larger the scale of fiscal transfer is, the easier voluntary tax cooperation is, implying that interregional transfers for correcting fiscal gaps are consistent with voluntary tax cooperation.