Satoshi Kasamatsu, Taku Masuda, Hikaru Ogawa

A Citizen-Candidate Model of Tax Competition with Interdependent Preferences

Rubrik: Articles
FinanzArchiv (FA)

Jahrgang 76 () / Heft 4, S. 313-328 (16)
Publiziert 22.09.2020

16,00 € inkl. gesetzl. MwSt.
Artikel PDF
In a citizen-candidate model of tax competition, this study describes the emergence of a policymaker (political leader) that has a hostile or altruistic stance toward neighboring countries. The results show that (i) when countries competing for mobile capital have similar positions on the import/export of capital, an altruistic citizen will be elected as the political leader, and (ii) when their capital positions differ, a citizen that has malicious preferences can become the representative of the country.

Satoshi Kasamatsu Keine aktuellen Daten verfügbar.

Taku Masuda Keine aktuellen Daten verfügbar.

Hikaru Ogawa Keine aktuellen Daten verfügbar.