A Mixed Duopoly with a Lifetime Employment Contract as a Strategic Commitment - 10.1628/001522106776667013 - Mohr Siebeck
Wirtschaftswissenschaft

Kazuhiro Ohnishi

A Mixed Duopoly with a Lifetime Employment Contract as a Strategic Commitment

Rubrik: Articles
FinanzArchiv (FA)

Jahrgang 62 () / Heft 1, S. 108-123 (16)

16,00 € inkl. gesetzl. MwSt.
Artikel PDF
This paper examines the behaviors of a profit-maximizing private firm and a social-welfare-maximizing public firm in a mixed market model with a lifetime employment contract as a strategic commitment. The paper then shows that there exists an equilibrium in which the private firm enters into a lifetime employment contract with its employees while the public firm does not.
Personen

Kazuhiro Ohnishi Keine aktuellen Daten verfügbar.