Zurück zum Heft
Cover von: Bureaucrats and Public Procurement
Dieter Bös

Bureaucrats and Public Procurement

Rubrik: Articles
Jahrgang 58 (2002) / Heft 2, S. 103-120 (18)
Publiziert 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/0015221022905687
Veröffentlicht auf Englisch.
inkl. gesetzl. MwSt.
  • Artikel PDF
  • lieferbar
  • 10.1628/0015221022905687
Beschreibung
This paper deals with a Niskanen type of public-procurement agency. We show that the procurement game should be separated into an investment game and a project game, the first game to be played before nature determines the actual realizations of benefit and costs of the project, the second game to be played afterward. In the first game the relationship-specific investments of agency and seller are determined, in the second game the decision on the production of the project is taken. In contrast to many other incomplete-contract papers, in our Niskanen setting it is meaningless to write only one contract which refers to both investment and production. We obtain the following results with respect to second-best welfare optimality: optimal procurement of the project can be attained under relatively weak assumptions; optimal investments of the seller (and only of the seller) may result under special circumstances; optimal investments of both agency and seller cannot be reached – both agents will overinvest.