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Cover von: Die verfassungsrechtliche Direktionskraft bei der Transformationssteuerung
Michael Fehling

Die verfassungsrechtliche Direktionskraft bei der Transformationssteuerung

Rubrik: Abhandlungen
Jahrgang 147 (2022) / Heft 2, S. 191-228 (38)
Publiziert 23.11.2022
DOI 10.1628/aoer-2022-0008
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  • 10.1628/aoer-2022-0008
Aufgrund einer Systemumstellung kann es vorübergehend u.a. zu Zugriffsproblemen kommen. Wir arbeiten mit Hochdruck an einer Lösung. Wir bitten um Entschuldigung für die Umstände.
In order to bring about substantial changes in economy and society, lawmakers must deploy a combination of regulatory instruments and strategies. Such is the case when shifting to an ecologically sustainable traffic system. Taking this as an example, the essay explores which principles and legal requirements should guide the search for the optimal regulatory mix. Within the boundaries of EU and national constitutional law, the search for the ideal regulatory mix merely seems to be a policy question. However, political and legal standards may at times overlap. This is particularly true for categories such as consistency, efficiency, path-dependence, and acceptance, which are mirrored in the legal standard of proportionality. When searching for the ideal regulatory mix, it is helpful to categorise such by how their individual components interrelate. One can either think of a principal instrument, accompanied by other, auxiliary instruments, supporting or expanding its regulatory function or mitigating potential side-effects. Those often serve to ensure the proportionality of the principal instrument and may therefore even be required by constitutional law. Yet, they must not effectively counteract the principal instrument's effectiveness. Otherwise, this might violate the constitutional requirement of regulatory consistency or integrity in systems of multi-level-governance. However, lawmakers enjoy considerable leeway when designing a regulatory mix.