Zurück zum Heft
Cover von: Hypergeorgism: When Rent Taxation Is Socially Optimal
Jan Siegmeier, Linus Mattauch, Ottmar Edenhofer

Hypergeorgism: When Rent Taxation Is Socially Optimal

Rubrik: Articles
Jahrgang 71 (2015) / Heft 4, S. 474-505 (32)
Publiziert 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/001522115X14425626525128
Veröffentlicht auf Englisch.
  • Artikel PDF
  • lieferbar
  • 10.1628/001522115X14425626525128
Imperfect altruism between generations may lead to insufficient capital accumulation. We study the welfare consequences of taxing the rent on a fixed production factor, such as land, in combination with age-dependent redistributions as a remedy. Taxing rent enhances welfare by increasing capital investment. This holds for any tax rate and recycling of the tax revenues except for combinations of high taxes and strongly redistributive recycling. We prove that specific forms of recycling the land rent tax – a transfer directed at fundless newborns or a capital subsidy – allow reproducing the social optimum under parameter restrictions valid for most economies.