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Cover von: The Logical Inconsistency of Transhumanism
Ralph Stefan Weir

The Logical Inconsistency of Transhumanism

Rubrik: Articles
Jahrgang 10 (2023) / Heft 2, S. 199-220 (22)
Publiziert 09.01.2024
DOI 10.1628/ptsc-2023-0021
Veröffentlicht auf Englisch.
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  • Open Access
    CC BY-SA 4.0
  • 10.1628/ptsc-2023-0021
Aufgrund einer Systemumstellung kann es vorübergehend u.a. zu Zugriffsproblemen kommen. Wir arbeiten mit Hochdruck an einer Lösung. Wir bitten um Entschuldigung für die Umstände.
Transhumanists such as Nick Bostrom and Ray Kurzweil argue that radical human enhancements will allow persons alive today to achieve a kind of technological immortality. The transhumanist movement has gained numerous followers who hope to live indefinitely as bio-enhanced 'posthumans' in a state of perpetual bliss. Transhumanism also has its opponents, however. Objections have been raised both to the possibility and to the desirability of the 'posthuman' future that transhumanists envision. This article argues that existing objections to transhumanism are vulnerable to one of two characteristic weaknesses. They depend either on debatable evaluative judgements or on doubtful speculation about the long-term future. Following this, I outline a new objection which, I claim, is not vulnerable to either weakness. According to this new objection, transhumanism presupposes two incompatible views of human nature.