Unemployment Insurance, Immigrants' Skills, and Native Earnings - 10.1628/001522104774102824 - Mohr Siebeck

Alexander Kemnitz

Unemployment Insurance, Immigrants' Skills, and Native Earnings

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Jahrgang 60 () / Heft 1, S. 111-139 (29)

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This paper investigates the effect of immigration on native earnings in the presence of unemployment and various social insurance policies. If immigration decreases the economy-wide skill ratio and the welfare state is actuarially fair, total native earnings increase under the constant-replacement-ratio policy, while they decrease under both the constant-benefit and the constant-average-income policy. If, however, immigrants improve the economy-wide skill ratio, natives as a whole gain unambiguously, but most under a constant benefit. The ranking between social policies is robust with respect to general taxation, but can reverse when native educational choices are endogenous.

Alexander Kemnitz Born 1968; 1993 Diplom-Volkswirt, University of Bonn; 2000 Dr. rer. pol., University of Mannheim; 2005 Habilitation in Economics.