Zurück zum Heft
Cover von: A Labor Market for Persuaders: Theory and Evidence from Financial Advice
Markus Walzl, Anna Ulrichshofer

A Labor Market for Persuaders: Theory and Evidence from Financial Advice

Rubrik: Articles
Jahrgang 180 (2024) / Heft 1, S. 187-209 (23)
Publiziert 30.10.2023
DOI 10.1628/jite-2023-0036
Veröffentlicht auf Englisch.
Normalpreis
  • Artikel PDF
  • lieferbar
  • 10.1628/jite-2023-0036
Beschreibung
We investigate the impact of records of complaints on behavior of financial advisers. In a model of financial advice with customers observing signals about an asset's performance but not learning the signal's precision, an adviser's choice of an information technology faces a trade-off: less precise technologies persuade a client to purchase more often, but less precise technologies also generate more consumer complaints and enhance the likelihood of complaints being successful. Modestly persuasive advisers have records with more than average complaints but less than average successful complaints – and are more likely to be (re)employed than advisers with clean records or records of successful complaints.