Carsten Helm, Michael Neugart

Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information

Jahrgang 169 () / Heft 3, S. 383-406 (24)

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With ideological parties being better informed about the state of the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by government members with heterogeneous policy preferences, it may become possible for the government to signal to the voters its private information about the necessity of reforms. This provides a rationale why coalition governments may find it easier to implement reforms than single-party governments, why oversized coalitions are formed, and why governments sometimes have cabinet members from opposing parties.

Carsten Helm Keine aktuellen Daten verfügbar.

Michael Neugart Keine aktuellen Daten verfügbar.