Coercion, Obnoxious Tasks, and Economic Efficiency - 10.1628/jite-2020-0051 - Mohr Siebeck
Wirtschaftswissenschaft

Soham Baksi, Pinaki Bose, Marc T. Law

Coercion, Obnoxious Tasks, and Economic Efficiency

Jahrgang 177 () / Heft 1, S. 120-134 (15)
Publiziert 04.12.2020

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Incomplete contracts and inadequate enforcement of labor rights, together with the asymmetry of power between a worker and her employer, create an environment where the employer can forcibly extract additional services (e.g., unpaid overtime or sexual favors) from the worker beyond the mutually agreed terms of exchange. We show that coercive impositions can coexist with voluntary transactions in the labor market, and that a positive incidence of coercion can adversely affect the efficiency of the corresponding market transactions. This may justify banning the legal market for the additional service if it is regarded as obnoxious by society.
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Soham Baksi Keine aktuellen Daten verfügbar.

Pinaki Bose Keine aktuellen Daten verfügbar.

Marc T. Law Keine aktuellen Daten verfügbar.