Urs Schweizer

Damages Regimes, Precaution Incentives, and the Intensity Principle

Jahrgang 169 () / Heft 4, S. 567-586 (20)

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This paper revisits the accident model at its roots and shows that the intensity principle provides a powerful analytical tool to handle a variety of issues in a unifying frame and based on common intuition. If courts impose inefficient standards, if a cap on liability exists, or if the principal must pay an information rent to induce precaution, the exact method of quantifying damages matters. The intensity principle allows comparing the intensity of precaution incentives under different damages regimes, such as strict liability, proportional liability, and the negligence rule. Moreover, it requires less restrictive assumptions than the more traditional approach.

Urs Schweizer Geboren 1947; Studium der Mathematik; 1972 Promotion; 1980 Habilitation; seit 1984 Professor für Wirtschaftliche Staatswissenschaften insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik an der Universität Bonn; 1998–2014 Gründungssprecher der BGSE (Bonn Graduate School of Economics).