Decreasing Returns, Patent Licensing, and Price-Reducing Taxes - 10.1628/jite-2019-0022 - Mohr Siebeck
Wirtschaftswissenschaft

Debapriya Sen, Giorgos Stamatopoulos

Decreasing Returns, Patent Licensing, and Price-Reducing Taxes

Jahrgang 0 () / Heft NIX, S. 1-17 (17)
Publiziert 06.02.2019

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This paper proposes simple tax policies that can alleviate the distortive effectsof royalties. We consider a Cournot duopoly under decreasing returns where oneof the firms has a patented technology that it can license to its rival using combinations of royalties and fixed fees. Under optimal licensing policies for the patentee, stronger diseconomies of scale result in lower market prices. It is possible to construct tax-transfer schemes for the firms that are Pareto-improving as well as deficit-neutral, i.e., these taxes lower market prices and collect sufficient revenue to compensate firms for their losses from taxation without incurring any deficit.
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Debapriya Sen Keine aktuellen Daten verfügbar.

Giorgos Stamatopoulos Keine aktuellen Daten verfügbar.