Endowment Effects in Proposal Rights Contests - 10.1628/jite-2021-0018 - Mohr Siebeck
Wirtschaftswissenschaft

Youjin Hahn, Chulyoung Kim, Sang-Hyun Kim

Endowment Effects in Proposal Rights Contests

Jahrgang 177 () / Heft 4, S. 449-476 (28)
Publiziert 09.11.2021

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We experimentally investigate a two-stage game where players compete to be recognized as a proposer in the first stage and play an ultimatum bargaining game in the second stage. We introduce a treatment regarding whether one of the subjects is framed to have proposal rights (without any material advantage) in the beginning of the game. We found that subjects who were framed to be »incumbents« spent significantly more resources to keep their proposal rights than others. We also present and analyze additional behavioral patterns observed in our proposal rights contest experiment.
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Youjin Hahn Keine aktuellen Daten verfügbar.

Chulyoung Kim Keine aktuellen Daten verfügbar.

Sang-Hyun Kim Keine aktuellen Daten verfügbar.