Cover von: Exclusive Dealing and Market Foreclosure: Further Experimental Results
Kathryn E. Spier, Claudia M. Landeo

Exclusive Dealing and Market Foreclosure: Further Experimental Results

Rubrik: Articles
Jahrgang 168 (2012) / Heft 1, S. 150-170 (21)
Publiziert 09.07.2018
DOI 10.1628/093245612799439980
Veröffentlicht auf Englisch.
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Beschreibung
This paper reports further experimental results on exclusive dealing contracts. We extend Landeo and Spier's (2009) work by studying Naked Exclusion in a strategic environment that involves a four-player, two-stage game. In addition to the roles of seller and buyers, our experimental environment includes the role of a potential entrant (a fourth passive player). Our findings are as follows. First, payoff endogeneity increases the likelihood of exclusion. Second, communication between the potential entrant and the buyers increases buyers' coordination on their preferred equilibrium (equilibrium with entry) and hence, reduces the likelihood of exclusion. Entrant-buyers communication also induces more generous offers.