Wirtschaftswissenschaft
Chulyoung Kim, Sang-Hyun Kim
Exoneree Compensation and Endogenous Plea Bargaining: Theory and Experiment
Jahrgang 177 (2021) / Heft 1, S. 28-55 (28)
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We study how plea-bargaining behaviors may respond to a change in two important policy variables in criminal law: the level of exoneree compensation and the accuracy of the exoneration process. Confirming the theoretical predictions, we experimentally find that prosecutor subjects make more lenient plea-bargaining offers in response to higher exoneree compensation, and less lenient offers in response to higher exoneration accuracy. We also find that defendant subjects do not directly respond to a variation in exoneree compensation, and are less likely to plead guilty when exoneration accuracy is lower, the effect being significantly stronger for guilty defendants.