Yuk-fai Fong, Ting Liu, Xiaoxuan Meng, Lin Zhao

Treatment Delay in Credence Goods Markets

Jahrgang 180 () / Heft 1, S. 43-73 (31)
Publiziert 30.10.2023

31,00 € inkl. gesetzl. MwSt.
Artikel PDF
This paper studies a credence goods market in which delaying treatments reduces treatment effectiveness, but doing so also allows the consumer to learn about the severity of her problem and the honesty of the expert. If consumers are homogeneous, cheating and treatment delay arise in equilibrium when the cost of delaying treatment is low. Suppose consumers have heterogeneous willingness to pay. If consumer heterogeneity is observable, high-valuation consumers are more likely to delay treatments and be victims of fraud. If the expert cannot observe consumer heterogeneity, low-valuation consumers are more likely to delay treatments and bear the cost of untreated minor problems.

Yuk-fai Fong Keine aktuellen Daten verfügbar.

Ting Liu Keine aktuellen Daten verfügbar.

Xiaoxuan Meng Keine aktuellen Daten verfügbar.

Lin Zhao Keine aktuellen Daten verfügbar.