Voluntary versus Compulsory Solidarity: Theory and Experiment - 10.1628/093245606777583503 - Mohr Siebeck

Werner Güth, Matthias Sutter, Harrie Verbon

Voluntary versus Compulsory Solidarity: Theory and Experiment

Jahrgang 162 () / Heft 2, S. 347-363 (17)

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We present an overlapping-generations model with two interacting teams, where young team members earn an income, whereas old team members depend on either intrateam transfers from young members (voluntary solidarity) or tax-financed transfers (compulsory solidarity). We derive the individually and team-specifically optimal decisions and present further behavioral hypotheses, including the crowding out of voluntary by compulsory solidarity. We test our hypotheses in an experimental study and examine (1) whether raising taxes crowds out voluntary transfers, (2) how income distributions influence voluntary and compulsory solidarity, and (3) whether participants prefer more to less compulsory solidarity.

Werner Güth ist emeritierter Direktor am Max-Planck-Institut für Erforschung von Kollektivgütern in Bonn.

Matthias Sutter Keine aktuellen Daten verfügbar.

Harrie Verbon Keine aktuellen Daten verfügbar.